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In this paper, we explore the interaction between lexical semantics and pragmat­
ics. Linguistic processing is informationally encapsulated and utilises relatively 
simple 'taxonomic' lexical semantic knowledge. On this basis, defeasible lexical 
generalisations deliver defeasible parts of logical form. In contrast, pragmatics is 
open-ended and involves arbitrary knowledge. Two axioms specify when pragmatic 
defaults override lexical ones. We demonstrate that modelling this interaction al­
lows us to achieve a more refined interpretation of words in a discourse context than 
either the lexicon or pragmatics could do on their own. 
1 Introduction 
Much recent work on lexical semantics has been concerned with accounting for the 
flexibility of word meaning. For example, there are many cases of regular polysemy, 
which includes not only the familiar verb alternations and nominalisations but also 
related senses of nouns such as the mass/portion senses beer, coffee etc and the 
container/contents alternation found with box, case and so on. There is also the 
phenomenon which Pustejovsky (e.g. 199 1 ,  in press) has called logical metonymy 
where additional meaning seems to arise for particular verb/noun or adjective/noun 
combinations. For example, ( la) usually has the same interpretation as (lb) : 
( 1 )  a. Mary enjoyed the book. 
b. Mary enjoyed reading the book. 
Syntactic realisation and lexical semantics are closely interrelated: it is not an 
arbitrary fact that beer is a mass noun when it refers to an unbounded quantity of 
liquid, and a count noun when it refers to the portion, or that enjoy can take a nominal 
complement. The challenge is to account for these processes compositionally in a 
way which allows for their partly conventional nature, within a general framework 
of linguistic description that recognises the role of pragmatics. 
Briscoe et al ( 1990) and Copestake ( 1992) argued for an interaction be­
tween lexical semantics and pragmatics in which purely linguistic processing is 
informationally encapsulated and utilises relatively simple 'taxonomic' lexical se­
mantic knowledge. Lexical semantic information and real world knowledge were 
not seen as necessarily distinct. Instead, linguistic processes had limited access to 
world knowledge, which could therefore interact with knowledge of language and 
possibly become conventionalised in various ways. For processes such as logical 
metonymy, linguistic processing delivered a partly defeasible logical form, which 
could be overridden by open-ended pragmatic reasoning. This work concentrated 
on providing an account of lexical semantics which was integrated with syntax 
and compositional semantics by utilising a uniformly unification-based approach. 
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However, the account was incomplete, because the interaction with pragmatics was 
left open. Defaults were simply used to aid in the encoding of static lexical general­
isations. Thus the use of lexical defaults in syntax and morphology (e.g. Flickinger 
( 1987), Evans and Gazdar (1989)) was extended to lexical semantics. But it was 
not related to the notion of defeasibility in the logical fonn, making it unclear how 
the unification based techniques served to distinguish defeasible from indefeasible 
parts of logical fonn. 
Here we review the earlier account and argue for a new treatment of defaults, 
which allows default results of lexical generalisations to persist as default beyond the 
lexicon and thus be available to the interface with pragmatic reasoning. We will make 
specific proposals for the fonnalisation of the pragmatic component, and illustrate 
how this allows us to account for alternative interpretations of words in a discourse 
context. The decision as to whether the lexical default survives at the discourse 
level or not will be modeled in a fonnally precise way in the nonmonotonic logic for 
pragmatic reasoning. Just two rules will be needed to encode the communication 
link. between default reasoning in the lexicon on the one hand, and default reasoning 
at the discourse level at the other. By providing this link. between lexical operations 
and discourse ones, we will explain how words are interpreted in discourse, in a 
way that neither the lexicon nor pragmatics could achieve on their own. 
2 Generalisations with Exceptions 
Verbs such as enjoy can be described as selecting semantically for an event in 
examples such as (2): 
(2) Mary enjoys playing the guitar. 
However enjoy can also take an NP complement, and in ( la) the complement the 
book denotes a physical object: 
( 1 )  a. Mary enjoyed the book. 
b. Mary enjoyed reading the book. 
Traditionally the only way to handle this is to assume two lexical entries for enjoy 
and to relate the different senses by meaning postulates. However, quite apart from 
the undesirability of proliferating senses, this does not explain why the usual reading 
of ( 1a) is ( lb), and it misses the generalisation to other cases where a noun phrase 
is interpreted as an event, such as those in (3). 
(3) a. 
b. 
c. 
John began a new book. 
John finished the beer. 
Bill enjoyed the film. 
d. After three glasses of champagne, John felt much happier. 
It also does not allow for cases where an NP and a VP are conjoined, such as (4): 
(4) Mary enjoys books, television and playing the guitar. 
Pustejovsky (e.g., 199 1 )  proposes that examples such as (la) be treated as 
involving logical metonymy. He treats nouns as having qualia structure as part 
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of their lexical entries which specifies possible events associated with the entity. 
For example, the telic (purpose) role of the qualia structure for book has a value 
equivalent to reading. When combined with enjoy, a metonymic interpretation 
is constructed where the particular sort of event which is likely to be involved 
can be determined from the qualia structure, which results in an interpretation for 
( la) equivalent to ( lb). In §3, we outline an account which is broadly similar to 
Pustejovsky's. In our treatment of ( la), the verb provides the basic metonymic 
interpretation, which can be glossed as (5a) with the logical form shown in (5b) : 1  
(5) a. 
b. 
c. 
Mary enjoyed some event associated with the book. 
3y, e, e' [enjoy(e, Mary, e') 1\ objectee,  e') 1\ act-on-pred(e', Mary, y) 1\ 
book(y)] 
3y, e, e' [enjoy(e, Mary, e') I\ object(e, e') I\ read(e', Mary, y) I\ book(y)] 
The constant act-on-pred is general over a broad class of predicates which we will 
not attempt to precisely delimit here, but which includes watch, eat, smoke and so 
on. However, the noun phrase provides the specific predicate involved, thus giving 
the interpretation shown in (5c) (which corresponds to (lb» . If the noun does not 
have a conventionalised telic role, the sentence is odd (out of context), as in (6) : 
(6) ? Mary enjoyed the pebble. 
2.1 Exceptions to the generalisation 
This generalisation about the interpretation has two classes of exceptions. The first 
case is exemplified by (7): 
(7) ? Mary enjoyed the dictionary. 
This is odd (again out of context) because dictionaries are usually used as reference 
books, and so its telic role referring, which is point-like, doesn't combine easily 
with enjoy, which has to be true of an event with significant duration. Thus (8) is 
only natural on an iterative interpretation: 
(8) Mary enjoyed referring to the dictionary. 
In Briscoe et al ( 1990) and Copestake (1992), such cases are allowed for by using 
a default inheritance hierarchy in the lexicon. So, although dictionary, like book, 
could inherit its lexical semantic characteristics from a more general class such as 
literature, the telic role of the qualia structure specified for dictionary corresponds 
to refer to, and this overrides the inherited value read. The use of defaults in 
the lexicon was taken to be strictly part of the description language, and led to a 
conventional lexical entry expressed as a typed feature structure. Using defaults is an 
important part of our theory of lexical structure, since it allows concise specification 
of lexical entries and avoids redundancy. However, purely lexical defaults do not 
extend to the second class of exceptions, which are triggered by context, or wider 
world knowledge. For example, (9a) means (9b) and not (9c): 
(9) a. My goat eats anything. He really enjoyed your book. 
b. The goat enjoyed eating your book. 
c. The goat enjoyed reading your book. 
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Similarly, our interpretation of Mary enjoyed the book is different if we know that 
Mary is a goat and is revised if we subsequently learn this. 
Briscoe et al ( 1990) allow for the second type of defaults by introducing a 
consistency operator M (cf. Reiter 1980) into the part of the logical form derived 
from the telic role. Thus the logical form of ( la) is (10);  it can be glossed as "the 
event enjoyed is reading, in the absence of information to the contrary": 
(10) 3y, e, e' [enjoy(e, Mary, e') /\ object(e, e') /\ Mread(e' ,  Mary, y) /\ book(y)] 
This account was intended as a placeholder in the absence of a proper 
treatment of pragmatics. Even so, it has some major disadvantages.  Firstly, the 
assumption that goats don't read is itself default, because of contexts such as fairy 
stories. Assuming that this default is encoded in the same logic, it is unclear how 
one could ensure that the axioms on M resolve the conflict between the default 
logical form and the default world knowledge in favour of the latter, especially 
since the two defaults are logically unrelated. Secondly, the consistency operator 
is introduced into the grammar as an ad-hoc stipulation. There is no connection 
between the defeasibility of the telic role with respect to its inheritance in the 
dictionary case and its defeasibility in the logical form. The pragmatic overriding 
in the goat example is due to the subject of enjoy. But the object can also have this 
effect, as shown in the examples in ( 1 1),  given that book made out of marzipan and 
book with blank pages can't be lexicalised (unlike dictionary). 
( 1 1 )  a. John enjoyed the book made out of marzipan. 
b. ? John enjoyed the book with blank pages. 
Intuitively, these cases are just like the dictionary one, in that they arise because 
the object is an abnormal book. In fact, we hypothesise that all cases of overriding 
of the logical form arise because the context is such that the entity is being used in 
an abnormal way. Ideally, therefore, we would like the defeasibility in the logical 
form to arise from the default nature of the usual purpose specification made in the 
lexicon. But, because defaults in Briscoe et al ( 1990) are simply part of the lexical 
description language, they could not persist beyond the lexicon, and the defeasibility 
in the logical form had to be stipulated. 
It is implausible that these problems could be resolved by adopting a purely 
lexical account, since arbitrarily complex reasoning could be involved in deciding 
that the subject can't read or that the object is unreadable. The alternative would 
be to claim that the interpretation of the event was purely pragmatic (i.e. that the 
logical form for ( 1  a) was simply (5b), with the interpretation of the predicate act-on­
pred being completely pragmatically determined). Such as approach is suggested 
by Hobbs et al. ( 1990) who use weighted abduction on pragmatic knowledge to 
determine the value of the underspecifiec predicate. But serious challenges to this 
line exist (see also Briscoe et al ( 1990» . 
First, an adequate theory has to account for the usual interpretations. The 
corpus analysis described in Briscoe et al ( 1990) showed that for most metonymic 
examples the telic role of the noun gives an appropriate reading. What's more, 
the explicit mention of the verbal predicate is relatively rare in such cases-that is, 
examples such as ( la) are more common than (lb). On the other hand, the contexts 
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in which the interpretation would not have been predicted by the qualia structure 
were infonnationally-rich (a concept which we will be able to fonnalise in §4). 
A purely pragmatic theory could only account for this data by assuming that some 
interpretations were privileged; for example, one would need a rule that encapsulates 
that enjoy the book by default means enjoy reading the book. But this would cause 
the same problems with prioritorising defaults which we mentioned above. That 
is, one would have to impose prioritorisations on world knowledge that weren't 
independently motivated, because the conflicting knowledge that was pertinent to 
the case would be logically unrelated. In the case of weighted abduction, it is thus 
unclear how one can assign the weights that guide inference in a principled way. 
Furthennore, there is some evidence which suggests that logical metonymy 
is partially conventionalised and triggered by the lexical item, rather than knowledge 
of the context. For example, (12) is strange, even if the hearer and the speaker both 
know that the doorstop is a book, which would not be predicted if the purpose were 
pragmatically determined by real world knowledge of the entity: 
( 12) ? John enjoyed the doorstop. 
There are also examples where the coerced fonn is less acceptable than might 
be expected if interpretation was simply a matter of finding a possible event: for 
example, (13) seems relatively strange, even though hiking is a common recreational 
activity: 
( 13) ? John enjoyed the path. 
Godard and J ayez ( 1993) give some data for commencer which leads them to suggest 
that the telic interpretation is only available for objects which are being in some 
sense consumed or affected by the action. However they then have to assume that 
books are affected by being read. Since it is unlikely that real world properties of 
books would necessarily lead to this conceptualisation, these exceptions support the 
hypothesis that logical metonymy is partially conventionalised. Conventionalised 
exceptions can be lexically encoded, but resist a purely pragmatic treatment. 
We therefore did not want to reject the hypothesis that the lexicon proposes 
a partially defeasible logical fonn. Instead, we make use of a new fonnalisation 
of defaults, which allows them to persist beyond the lexicon. The default nature 
of the part of the logical fonn contributed by the telic role is not simply stipulated, 
but arises directly from the lexical default. The interface with pragmatics is set 
up so that reasoning with real world knowledge can override the defaults proposed 
lexically. Thus we can provide an integrated account of the interaction of lexical 
semantics and pragmatics. We describe this account in §3 and §4 but first we briefly 
review some other data which requires this sort of treatment. 
2.2 Adjectives and compound nouns 
Some examples of adjective interpretation can be treated along the same broad lines 
as enjoy. Pustejovsky (e.g., 1991 ,  in press) and others have argued against distinct 
lexical entries for fast, for each of its senses infast car, fast typist, fast motorway 
and so on. Instead, it is possible to assume just a single lexical entry forfast, where 
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its different 'senses' arise from the process of syntagmatic co-composition. The 
lexical generalisation is much like that for enjoy: adjectives like fast predicate over 
the telic role of the artefact (althoughfast can also apply to other parts of the qualia). 
So the lexical account predicts that fast car means a car which goes fast, and fast 
typist means a typist who types fast, via the same entry for fast. 
But as before, some discourse contexts trigger exceptions to this general­
isation. In (14), fast typist means typist who runs fast, and not typist who types 
fast. 
( 14) a. All the office personnel took part in the company sports day last week. 
b. One of the typists was a good athlete, but the other was struggling to 
finish the courses. 
c. The fast typist came first in the 100m. 
As in the enjoy examples, the pragmatic component needs to know that the inter­
pretation of fast typist as a typist who types fast is a default. 
Another case where a default interpretation apparently arises from the lexi­
con/grammar is the interpretation of compounds. For example, there appears to be 
a generalisation that when a noun that refers to a solid substance combines with a 
noun that refers to a solid artefact, the compound refers to the artefact made of the 
substance (wickerwork chair, plastic toy, wrought iron table, mahogany dresser). 
On the other hand, some compounds can only be interpreted in context. Downing 
attests ( 15) in a context where there was a table already set with a glass of orange 
juice by three places and apple juice by the fourth: 
( 15) Please sit in the apple juice chair. 
Here apple juice chair means "chair in front of a place setting with apple juice", but 
obviously this meaning cannot be listed in the lexicon. 
Examples like ( 15) have led to the suggestion that noun-noun compounds 
should be assigned a representation where the relationship between the two halves 
of the compound is left completely unspecified and further interpretation should be 
left to the pragmatic component (e.g., Bauer, 1983). There are, however. serious 
objections to this application of the pragmatic dustbin. Without further elaboration 
it gives no explanation of the fact that the majority of compound nouns behave in a 
semi-regular manner. But if the above generalisation about solid substance/artefact 
compounds were encoded via a standard default inheritance mechanism, default and 
non-default information would not be distinguished in the result. But the "made­
of' relationship between the nouns in compounds like wickerwork chair can be 
overridden in discourse: 
( 16) At school, everyone worked on crafts in groups round a big table, sitting on 
brightly coloured chairs. To make sure everyone could reach the materials, 
the groups used particular chairs: the wickerwork chairs were made of red 
plastic. for example. 
These observations make noun-noun compounds a good candidate for the use of de­
faults which persist beyond the lexicon, along broadly similar lines to the discussion 
of logical metonymy above. 
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3 Persistent Default Unification and the Lexicon 
We use a typed feature structure formalism comparable to that used in HPSG (pollard 
and Sag, 1994) to implement the grammar and the lexicon. The standard method of 
implementing default inheritance within unification-based approaches to linguistic 
representation is to use some variety of default unification (see Copestake, 1993, for 
a overview). This is usually taken to be an operation in the description language, 
which allows one feature structure (FS) to incorporate only the consistent information 
from another FS. Inconsistent information is ignored, rather than causing failure 
of the operation as in normal unification. But since default unification returns a 
normal FS, there is no distinction between default and non-default information in 
the result. Thus, for example, there is no way of specifying that the telic role for 
the literature class is defeasible. The lexical entry for dictionary could override it 
(in fact dictionary could override any part of the information it was inheriting) but 
there is no way in which it can be stated to be defeasible more generally. 
There is another problem with using this operation as a basis for lexical 
organisation. With the exception of Young and Rounds ( 1993), default unification 
is order-dependent. This somewhat compromises the declarativity of the formalism, 
but is not a serious problem for the lexicon itself, because all the entries to be 
unified are in a fixed hierarchy and an inheritance order can be imposed. But 
in a discourse situation, one cannot predict which pieces of information are to 
be unified, in advance of starting the discourse parsing process. So the interface 
between discourse processing and order dependent lexical processing would have 
to take into account the order in which the unification operations are done, which is 
impractical. 
Lascarides et al ( 1994) have defined an order independent form of default 
unification over typed default feature structures (TDFSS). TDFSs are typed FSs where 
default information is marked as such, and the default unification operation is one 
where defaults in a TDFS, if they survive at all, survive with the marking that they 
are default. So this unification operation is one which permits defaults to persist 
as default beyond the lexicon's boundaries, in the sense that one can distinguish in 
the FS which parts are default. Because of this, the operation is known as Persistent 
Default Unification (POU). 
TDFSS are TFSS augmented with a slash notation which demarcates the inde­
feasible parts from the defeasible. Values to the left of the slash are indefeasible 
and those to the right defeasible (indefeasible/defeasible). We abbreviate this to 
ldefeasible where the indefeasible value is completely general, and omit the slash 
when the defeasible and indefeasible values are the same. So, for example, the TDFS 
( 17) states that the value on the feature F is by default G:a, although the type of the 
FS and the existence of the feature F itself is non-default: 
( 17) [ � = / [ G = a ]  ] 
When a default value survives POU (notated 1h it does so with the slash notation. 
The details of POu are given in Lascarides et al (1994) but two examples are given 
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Where f is more specific than (c) t: 
[ t ] n [t' ] - [ tl ] F = a  F = /b  F = a  Defeat of DMP 
[ t ] n [ tl ] - [ tl ] F = /a F = /b  - F = /b  SpecificityfThe Penguin Principle 
Figure 1 :  Some examples of PDU 
[ artefact ] 
TELIC PRED = eventuality 
I 
[ represent-art ] 
TELIC PRED = Iperceive 
� 
[ �wrCrp�D = Iwatch ] [�Ht�RED = lread ] 
I � [ film ] [ �l<!WEo = Irefer ] [ book ] 
Figure 2: The Telic Role of Artefacts 
in Figure 1 .  These indicate that pou validates defeat of Defeasible Modus Ponens 
(OMP), and unlike Young and Rounds' definition, it also validates Specificity (i.e., 
defeasible information on more specific TDFSs overrides conflicting defaults on more 
general IDFSs). 
Lascarides et al ( 1994) show one way of encoding the inheritance of telic 
roles in POU (Figure 2). So, for example, the telic role of literature is read and 
this is inherited by book, but for the subclass dictionary it's refer-to. This is 
superficially similar to previous descriptions, apart from the slash, but here default 
inheritance can proceed in any order to compute the telic roles. 
Copes take and Briscoe ( 1995) show how to state the lexical generalisation 
concerning enjoy, that it predicates over the telic role of the artefact as shown in 
Figure 3.2 When enjoy takes an artefact-denoting object (which instantiates the CAT 
SUBCAT 'slot' ), the event that is enjoyed is instantiated via the telic role, as indicated 
by the coindexation IE in Figure 3. In the figure, R is the predicate associated with 
the verb itself (e.g., enjoy) IE and IilI indicate coindexation (we are using letters 
here for readability rather than the conventional integers). The instantiated form is 
CAT SUBCAT = / ;� = IilI [Q(Y)l ] )  
[coercing 
1 SEM - [,[ [R(" xJ ) A � ""-<m-pred( " , x , y) A " I  \ QUALIA TELIC PRED = IE 
Figure 3: The generalisation for verbs like enjoy. 
2 1 1 
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[coercing 
1 
CAT SUBCAT = ( [ ;� =  IiiI 
] )  QUALIA 1ELIC PRED = iflact-on-predlread 
SEM = [e] [enjoy(e , x, e' )  1\ lfI (e' , x, y) 1\ liil book(y)] 
Figure 4: The sign for enjoy instantiated with information from the NP for the book 
(ignoring tense and the determiner) 
shown in Figure 4. 
In these figures the logical form is shown in a linearised notation for read­
ability, rather than in its actual encoding in TDFSS. It is important, however, that 
we use the same formalism throughout, since it means we can use PDU to construct 
the semantics, just as normal unification is often used in FS based frameworks. We 
have shown the path QUALIA TELIC PRED explicitly, to illustrate that it is the predi­
cate itself which is slashed. The semantic representation assumed is InL (Indexed 
Language, Zeevat et al 1987), which has a direct equivalence to DRT. We'll assume 
the use of DR!' here, since this is the semantic representation scheme that underlies 
the pragmatic component DICE (Lascarides and Asher, 1991 ,  1993) that we'll link 
the grammar to. We assume that DRS-conditions that arise from elements on the 
RHS of the slash notation are embedded in an operator * in the DRS conditions, and 
this will affect their truth conditional status. So the logical form of ( la) derived via 
PDU is ( la'): 
( 1 )  a. 
i. 
John enjoyed the book. 
e, e' , x, y 
john(x) 
enjoy(e, x , e')  
book(y) 
act-on-pred{e' , x, y)  
*read{e' , x, y) 
For brevity, we have omitted WFFs of the form *4> when 4> also holds. 
We now have the task of assigning a semantics to DRS-conditions of the 
form *4>. This must indicate that they're derived via defaults in the lexicon. PDU is 
formalised in a conditional logic. So the way defaults behave in PDU is determined 
by constraints on a function *pdu that's part of the model, and which takes worlds 
and propositions to propositions. *pdu represents assumptions about the behaviour 
of defaults in the lexicon: *pdu ( w, p) encodes what according to w, normally follows 
from p. So, let K be DRS, and let K- be the DRS K with all the DRS-conditions of 
the from *'l/J removed. Then we can define the semantics of *4> as follows: 
• M, w PI *4> in DRS K just in case for all w' in *pdu (w, [K-]) , there is a 
9 ;2 f such that M, w' h 4>. 
DRS conditions of the form *� aren't asserted to be true in the actual world w, since 
according to the assumptions about *pdu in PDU, it's not necessarily the case that 
w E *pdu (w, p) . So in ( Ii), the logical semantics doesn 't entail that the event that 
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was enjoyed was a reading; however, it does entail that an event was enjoyed by John. 
Thus we have utilised the fact that defaults persist, by assigning the default results 
of PDU a different truth conditional status in logical semantics from the indefeasible 
results. It is now up to the pragmatic component to assess whether read should be 
inferred as the appropriate event in the discourse context. The lexicon has proposed 
this, but clues from the more open ended pragmatic reasoning may dispose of this 
proposal, and replace it with another. We'll come to this in the next section. 
Copestake and Briscoe (1995) treat fast in a very similar way to enjoy. 
The coindexation between the telic role of the object NP in the subcat list and the 
event that fast predicates over in the semantics is inherited via PDU from a lexical 
generalisation over the class of adjectives of which fast is a member (other members 
are slow, careful, long). In this case the telic role of typist is [xJ Vtype(e, x)] , where 
x is coindexed with the 'normal' variable. But this is defeasible: it's on the RHS of 
the slash. The truth conditional effects of this is are represented in the DRS ( 1 8) for 
fast typist, where the formula type(e, x) is within the scope of * :  
x, e  
typist(x) 
( 1 8) fast(e} 
act-pred( e, x) 
*type(e, x) 
So the lexicon proposes that the event fast that predicates over is type, but this may 
be overridden by pragmatic information. 
4 Linking The Lexicon to Pragmatics 
4.1 DICE 
We'll link the lexicon and grammar to a theory of pragmatics: specifically DICE 
(Discourse in Commonsense Entailment, Lascarides and Asher 199 1 ,  1993). This 
is a model of discourse interpretation which encodes real world knowledge like goats 
don 't read, and more generally, it encodes background information that's used to 
compute the rhetorical links between segments of discourse. The representation of 
discourse structure produced by DICE are segmented DRSs (SDRSS) (Asher 1993). 
An SDRS is a recursively defined structure which connects DRSs together using 
discourse relations like Elaboration, Contrast and so on. These relations impose 
coherence constraints on the discourse. The details of these are in Asher 1 993, Asher 
and Lascarides 1 995, Lascarides and Asher 1993. We'll exploit these constraints 
to reason about when lexical defaults should be overridden. Simply put: lexical 
defaults will normally be overridden when they lead to a bad discourse. 
DICE uses the default logic Commonsense Entailment (CE) (Asher and Mor­
reau, 1991)  to reason about pragmatic interpretation. This logic exploits conditions 
of the form: A > B, which means If A then normally B. So one could represent 
goats don 't read as the schema: 
• Goa t s  Don ' t  Read : goat(x) > ...,read(e, x, y) 
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Furthermore, all default rules for computing the rhetorical relation that connects 
DRSs together are of the form given in ( 19). Here ('T, a, /3) is the update function 
which can be glossed "/3 is to be attached to a with a discourse relation, where a is 
part of the discourse structure 'T built so far". "Some stuff" stands for syntactic and 
semantic information about a and /3 and R is a particular discourse relation: 
( 19) «'T, a, /3) /\ some stuff) > R(a, /3) 
Details of these discourse attachment rules appear in Lascarides and Asher ( 1991 ,  
1993) and Asher and Lascarides ( 1995). 
The nonmonotonic Validity of CE (�) has several nice properties. There are 
three that are relevant here. First, it validates DMP: if one default applies and its 
consequent is consistent with the KB, then it's nonmonotonically inferred. Second, 
it validates the Specificity Principle: if contlicting defaults have their antecedents 
verified, then the consequent of the default with the most specific antecedent is 
preferred. Finally, for each deduction A�B there is a corresponding embedded 
default in the object language (that is, a formula in which one > occurs within 
the scope of another) which links boolean combinations of the formulae A and 
B, and which is verified to be true. We gloss this embedded default formula as 
:leA, B) . So :leA, B) means A�B. This amounts to a weak deduction theorem. 
The object language formula :l( A, B) means that A nonmonotonically yields B in 
the metalanguage. 
4.2 !Joking PDU and DICE 
To link the PDU treatment of lexical productivity to pragmatic knowledge, we add 
two axioms to DICE. First, Defaults Survive captures the intuition that defaults in 
the lexicon normally survive at the discourse level: 
• Defau l t s  Survive : *¢ > ¢ 
Second, we need an axiom that ensures that when the consequents of discourse 
processing and lexical processing contlict, the discourse processing wins. This is 
what happens in (20), for example, where the PDU prediction, that the event enjoyed 
was a reading, is overridden by the conflicting pragmatic information stipulated in 
the >-rule Goats Don't Read. 
(20) The goat enjoyed the book. 
Let KBh be obtained from the knowledge base KB, by removing all the DRS 
conditions of the form *¢ (h stands for "hard information"). Then Discourse 
Wins states: when this KB yields a nonmonotonic conclusion 1/1, then normally this 
survives the KB with conditions like *¢ added to it: 
• D i s cour s e  wins : (*¢ /\ :l(K Bh , 1/1» > 1/1 
This rule is called Discourse Wins, because by the Specificity Principle with Defaults 
Survive, if 'I/J conflicts with f/J, then 'I/J is nonrnonotonically inferred and f/J is not, 
even if *¢ was in the KB. In other words, the clues from discourse context, if there 
are any, override contlicting results of PDU. On the other hand, if ¢ and 1/1 are 
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compatible, they will both be inferred by DMP. SO Discourse Wins also serves to 
model how discourse information can further refine the information about meaning 
obtained from the lexicon. 
Let's now investigate how this affects the interpretation of the above exam­
ples. First, consider ( la), whose logical form expressed in DRT is ( tal) : 
(1)  a. John enjoyed the book. 
e, el , x, y 
john(x) 
a/. enjoy(e, x, e/) 
book(y) 
*read( e/ , x, y) 
There are no >-rules which give information about the kinds of things that John 
enjoys. Moreover, Defaults Survive applies with the following instantiation of the 
schema: *read( el , x, y) > read( el , x, y) . So by DMP on this rule, one infers that 
John enjoyed reading the book. 
Now compare this with (20), whose logical form is similar to ( tal) :  
(20) The goat enjoyed the book. 
e, e/ , x, y  
goat(x) 
(20") enjoy(e, x, el ) 
book(y) 
*read( e/ , x, y) 
First consider the nonmonotonic consequences on K Bh•  Goat's Don't Read ap­
plies, but Defaults Survive doesn't with respect to K Bh, because K Bh contains no 
conditions of the form *4>. So by DMP on Goats Don't Read, ""read(el , x, y) follows 
nonmonotonically from KBh. That is, ::J(KBh' ...,read(el , x, y) ) holds. In the KB 
as a whole, the instantiation of Defaults Survive given in (21 )  applies just as before. 
But in contrast to (1 a), so does the instantiation of the schema Discourse Wins given 
in (22): 
(21 )  *read(el , x, y) > read(el , x, y) 
(22) (*read(el , x , y) 1\ ::J(KBh , ""read(el , x, y)))  > ""read(el, x , y) .  
So by the Specificity Principle on (21 )  and (22), ""read(el , x, y) i s  inferred. 
4.3 Discourse Context 
We would need more >-rules to infer that the event enjoyed is an eating in (20). 
But in (23), we could infer that the goat enjoyed eating the book via the rhetorical 
structure of the discourse and the existing DICE rules which compute that rhetorical 
structure (Asher and Lascarides, 1995). 
(23) My goat ate the whole library. a 
He really enjoyed your book. f3 
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The relevant rules for discourse attachment, which are taken from Asher and Las­
carides (1995), are given below: 
• Narra t i on : (T, a, (3) > Narration(a, (3) 
• Axiom on Narra t i on : O(Na"ation(a, (3) � e", -< ep ) 
• Di s t in c t  Common Topi c :  
O(Narration(a, (3) � 3,h .J). a /\ , .J). (3 /\ ..,(a .J). (3) /\ .., «(3 .J). a)) )  
• Subtype : 
O« 8i (e-condn"" a, 11 ) /\ (Ji (e-condnp, (3, 12) /\ 
e-condnp !; e-condn", /\ 12 C 11 ) � Subtype(a, (3» 
• E l abora t i on : (T, a, (3) /\ Subtype(a, (3) > Elaboration(a, (3) 
• Axiom on Elabora t i on : O(Elaboration(a, (3) � a .J). (3) 
Narration together with its Axiom capture the intuition that normally the textual 
order of events match their temporal order. Distinct Common Topic acts as a 
coherence constraint: it stipulates that a narrative must have a distinct common 
topic (, .J). a means I is a topic for a). Elaboration states that if (3 is to be attached 
to a and (3 is a subtype of a, then normally Elaboration( a, (3) holds; its Axiom says 
that a must be a topic of (3. Subtype(a, (3) can be inferred via the monotonic rule 
Subtype, which states: if (a) the DRSs 11 and 12 respectively identify the thematic 
role 8i in a and (3, with respect to the event conditions e-condn", and e-condnp, and 
(b) e-condnp is a subtype of e-condn", (for example, The goat ate x is a subtype of 
The goat enjoyed eating x), and (c) 12 is part of 11 (e.g., book is part of what makes 
up library), then (d) (3 is a subtype of a. 
Consider how these rules apply in (9a). The DRS (3 representing the second 
sentence in (9a) must be attached to the DRS a representing the first. The anaphor 
he must be identified with an accessible antecedent, and the SDRT constraints on 
accessibility restrict this to being the goat. Now, if the metonymy in (3 is resolved 
to enjoy reading a book, then the only candidate discourse relation according to the 
above rules for discourse attachment is Narration. By Distinct Common Topic, this 
relation requires a distinct common topic, which in SDRr is obtained by generalising 
the propositions in the narrative to produce a single predicate argument structure. 
But the resulting topic is too general to really establish anything better than weak: 
coherence: it's something like the goat did things. Indeed, resolving metonymy to 
anything of the form enjoy VP-ing your book, where VP is not related to eating, 
results in a similar interpretation of the discourse i.e., the coherence is weak:. 
In DICE, pragmatic interpretations of sentences that lead to weak: discourse 
coherence are avoided if possible, via the Interpretation Constraint below (Las­
carides et al 1995): 
• Interpretation Cons traint 
(a) « (T, a, f3) 1\ Info(a, (3) 
(b) �KB«(3' , weak(T U (3))) 
(c) > ..,f3' 
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In this schema, Info(a, {3) is a gloss for all monotonic information about a and {J, 
and ::JKs(A, B) means ::J(KB A A, B) and -,(KB, B) (that is, B nonmonotonically 
follows from the K B augmented with A but not from the K B alone). So in words, 
the Interpretation Constraint states that if (a) (3 is to be connected to a with a 
discourse relation, and (3 and a are both true, and (b) if the KB that includes not 
only the update task of (3 to a, but also the information (3' nonmonotonica1ly leads 
to 'll discourse of only weak coherence or no coherence at all, then normally (c) 
(3' doesn't hold. This rule applies to (23) whenever (3' is an assumption that the 
metonymy in (3 is resolved to an event that's unrelated to eating, because as we've 
stated, such an assumption produces a weak. narrative. However, the Interpretation 
Constraint doesn't apply if the metonymy is resolved to an event which is related to 
eating. This is because in this case, the event condition of eating in a is a subtype 
of the event condition of enjoy eating in (3, and the book in (3 is taken to be a 
part of the library in a. So Subtype applies in the monotonic component, thereby 
yielding Elaborntion( a, (3) in the nonmonotonic component. So there's no need for 
a distinct common topic between a and (3 anymore: Elaboration dictates that a is 
the topic of the discourse. 
Consequently, DMP on the Interpretation Constraint rules out all resolutions 
of metonymy apart from eat, and so K Bh yields a nonmonotonic conclusion that 
eat( e' , x, y) holds. Therefore at the discourse level, the following rules apply, and 
conflict (assuming e' can't be both a reading and eating): 
(24) *read(e' , x, y) > read(e' , x, y) 
(*read(e' , x , y) A ::J(KBh, eat(e' , x, y) ) )  > eat(e' , x , y) 
So by the Specificity Principle, eat( e' , x, y) is inferred. This leads to the nonmono­
tonic conclusion that Elaboration( a, (3) holds via Subtype and Elaboration. 
These examples provide further motivation for conventionalising some as­
pects of metonymy. For suppose we were to compute metonymy solely within 
pragmatics. Then we would need to replace the information in Figures 2 and 3 
with >-rules in DICE. Such a strategy is technically possible, but representation of 
pragmatic information would be trickier. For example, to interpret (20) correctly, 
the real world knowledge that goats don't read must win over the >-rules concerning 
generalisations about enjoy on telic roles. This means that the antecedent of this 
rule would have to be more specific, otherwise the logic won't resolve the conflict in 
the right way. Indeed, there is currently no logic for nonmonotonic reasoning which 
resolves conflict between unrelated default rules without assuming prioritorisation 
mechanisms that are extraneous to the logic itself. So Goats Don't Read would have 
to be replaced with something like (26), so that it could compete with the >-rule 
(25) which replaces the information in Figures 2 and 3 relevant to enjoy the book: 
(25) (enjoy( e, x, e') A literature(y)) > read( e' , x, y) 
(26) (enjoy(e, x, e' ) A goat(x} A literature(y» > -,read(e' , x, y)  
This rule is self-evidently extremely specific, but a rule of this form is required 
for Specificity to hold. But by spreading the load between pragmatics and the 
lexicon, and having communication links between them, we can 'loosen up' how 
we represent information. 
217 
218  Alex Lascarides and Ann Copestake 
compound-noun < binary-rule 
[ lex-noun 1 
ORTH = IIJ. �  
SYN = noun-cat -+ 
SEM = 131 "  131 " pred( IIl . � ) 
QUALIA = 17I nomquaUa 
[ lex-noun 1 [ lex-noun 1 
ORTH = III ORTH = � 
SYN = noun-cat . SYN = noun-cat 
SEM = 131 p( � ) SEM = 131 QIIl )  
QUALIA = nomquaUa QUALIA = 111 
Figure 5: General schema for endocentric noun-noun compounds 
made-of-substance-schema < compound-noun 
[ lex-count-noun 
] 
SEM = 131 "  131 " predlmade-of-substante( IIl . � ) -+ 
QUALIA = artefact 
SEM = 131 p( iYI ) . SEM - 131 Q( IIl )  
[ lex-uncount-noun 1 [ Iex-count-noun 
] QUALIA = sUbstance QUALIA = artefact 
Figure 6: A compound noun subschema 
Now consider ( 14), where fast typist means typist who runs fast. 
( 14) a. All the office personnel took part in the company sports day last week. 
b. One of the typists was a good athlete, but the other was struggling to 
finish the courses. 
c. The fast typist came first in the 100m. 
The axioms Defaults Survive and Discourse Wins capture this. In outline, the 
Interpretation Constraint in DICE blocks the assumption that the fast typist in ( 14c) 
is different from the typists mentioned in ( 14a,b) because this would lead to a weak 
discourse. Consequently, Subtype and Elaboration yield the intuitive attachment 
that (14c) is an Elaboration of ( 14a,b). 
As we've mentioned, the fast typist must identify a unique typist from 
(14a,b). There are two typists, who have been differentiated only on the grounds 
of their athletic ability. So verifying the uniqueness condition is possible only 
iffast is equated with athletic ability. Thus :J(KBh ,fast(e') 1\ nm(e', x) )  holds 
(where typist(x) E K Bh). So Defaults Survive and Discourse Wins both apply, and 
they have the consequents type ( e', x) and nm( e' , x) respectively. Assuming that e' 
can't be both a typing and a running, these rules conflict. And so by the Specificity 
Principle, nm( e' , x) is nonmonotonically inferred. In contrast, in 'neutral' discourse 
contexts, DMP on Defaults Survive will yield that fast typist means typist who types 
fast. 
4.4 Compound nouns 
A general schema for endocentric compound interpretation is shown in Figure 5, 
with an underspecified predicate, pred, relating the indices of the constituents. Most 
compounds will instantiate one or more of the subschemata which inherit from this 
schema with the predicate relating the parts of the compound marked as persistently 
default. An example of a more specific schema is shown in Figure 6. This schema 
defeasibly specifies that the compounding predicate is made-of-substance. 
The Pragmatics of Word Meaning 
The structure below shows the result of instantiating the schema in Figure 6 
with wickerwork chair (ignoring the substructure in wickerwork). 
[ lex-count-noun 
] 
SEM = wickerwork( 141)  1\ chair( � )  1\ predlmade-of-substance( � . 141) 
QUALIA = artefact 
In normal contexts, this interpretation will stand. However, since the com­
pounding predicate is defeasible, it can be pragmatically overridden along the same 
lines as the examples discussed above. In a context such as ( 1 6), an alternative in­
terpretation is found, since the default interpretation is contradicted by the context: 
( 1 6) At school, everyone worked on crafts in groups round a big table, sitting on 
brightly coloured chairs. To make sure everyone could reach the materials, 
the groups used particular chairs: the wickerwork chairs were made of red 
plastic, for example. 
The pragmatic interpretation of were made of red plastic blocks the inference that 
the chairs were made of wickerwork. Moreover, the discourse structure of ( 16)-­
and in particular, the line of reasoning in DICE that leads to Elaboration-yields a 
nonmonotonic inference from K Bh that wickerwork chair is to be interpreted as 
chair which is sat on by someone who works on wickerwork. So by the Specificity 
Principle on Defaults survive and Discourse Wms, the established meaning of 
wickerwork chair is overridden in ( 16) ; instead it means chairs made of red plastic, 
which are sat on by people working with wickerwork. 
Briscoe et al (1990) claim that lexical generalisations are only cancelled in 
contexts that are informationally rich. We have illuminated in a formal setting ex­
actly what this means. According to Defaults Survive and Discourse Wms, a lexical 
generalisation *4> can be cancelled only if :J(KBh• -.4» . So a discourse context is 
'informationally rich' if, independently of all default lexical generalisations, there 
are discourse clues which enable one to nonmonotonically conclude the exception. 
S Conclusion 
Many lexical generalisations are of the sort where there are exceptions to the rules, 
which are triggered by information outside the lexicon. This poses a challenge to 
monotonic accounts of the lexicon and to those which treat defaults as an abbrevia­
tory convention and restrict their use to the description language. 
Using an account of lexical organisation involving persistent default unifi­
cation, we showed that links to a pragmatic component were possible with just two 
axioms: the first ensures that lexical generalisations normally apply in a discourse 
context, while the second ensures that normally, discourse information about how 
a word should be interpreted-if there is any-wins over defaults from the lexicon. 
This accounted for exceptions to lexical generalisations in a discourse context in 
two areas: logical metonymy and compound nouns. Moreover, the axioms clarified 
in a formal setting the claim in Briscoe et al ( 1990), that exceptions to lexical gen­
eralisations can only be triggered by discourse contexts which are informationally 
rich. 
This is just a first step towards linking lexical and pragmatic knowledge. 
Much more needs to be done, to achieve a robust theory of lexical interpretation in 
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a discourse context. Nevertheless, these first results indicate the kinds of operations 
that one needs in both components for them to communicate properly. In the gram­
mar and lexicon, persistent defaults are needed, while in pragmatics, the Specificity 
Principle and embedded defaults are a crucial part of the account. 
Endnotes 
* We are grateful to Ted Briscoe, Nicholas Asher, Dan Flickinger and Daniele Go­
dard and to participants at SALT and the 1995 AAAI spring symposium on represen­
tation and acquisition of lexical knowledge for their helpful comments on material 
presented here. This work was partially supported by the ESPRIT Acquilex-ll, 
project BR-73 15 ,  grant to Cambridge University. 
1 Here and in the following examples we ignore temporal information for the sake 
of simplicity. 
2 Unlike Pustejovsky (in press) and Briscoe et al ( 1990), this account assumes 
that the FS for enjoy when it takes an object which denotes an individual entity is 
distinct from the form which takes an event (although both inherit from a common 
underspecified form). The 'coercion' from object to event is represented as internal 
to the verb semantics. Some of the reasons for preferring this account are given in 
Copestake and Briscoe ( 1992, 1995) and Godard and Jayez ( 1993). However the 
differences between this and the alternative account where the NP itself undergoes 
coercion are largely irrelevant here. 
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